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Abstract. An analysis of international arbitration indicates that, prima facie, certain crucial 
differences between the continental approach and common law practice exist. The main differ- 
ences relate to the general hearing (writtentverbal), the position of the parties in relation to the 
arbitrator, the proof-taking procedure, the duty to give reasons for the decision, and the division 
of competences between the judiciary and the arbitrator. On the other hand it must be pointed 
out that the main trends in international arbitration lead to a blurring of these differences. In 
particular mention may be made of the lex mercatoria, reduction in judicial control, and the 
evolution towards transnational arbitration. 
RCsumC. Quand on Ctudie l'arbitrage international, on s'aper~oit au premier abord qu'il existe 
des diffkrences essentielles entre l'approche continentale et la pratique de common law. Ces 
diffkrences se manifestent spkcialement en ce qui concerne les rkgles gknCrales relatives aux 
auditions (Ccriteslorales), la situation des parties h 1'Cgard de l'arbitre, le droit de la preuve, la 
force obligatoire de la dkcision et la division des compktences entre le judiciaire et l'arbitre. 
D'un autre c8t6, on doit constater que les tendances fondamentales en matikre d'arbitrage 
international contribuent b l'effacement de ces diffkrences. On peut spkcialement se rkfCrer 
b la lex mercatoria, aux restrictions misus au contr6le judiciaire et h l'kvalution vers un arbitrage 
transnational. 
Zusammenfassung. Analysiert man das internationale Schiedsgerichtsverfahren, bemerkt 
man auf den ersten Blick wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen der Methode des continentalen 
Rechtskreises und der Praxis im Bereich des common law. Diese Unterschiede treten beson- 
ders in Hinblick auf die allgemeine Anharung (schriftlich/miindlich), die Stellung der Parteien 
im VerhBltnis zum Schiedrichter, das Beweisverfahren, die Pflicht, die Entscheidung zu 
begriinden, und in Bezug auf die Aufteilung der Kompetenzen zwischen der ~er ich t sb ike i t  
und dem Schiedrichter auf. Auf der anderen Seite mu13 man feststellen, daR grundlegende 
Tendenzen in internationalen Schiedsgerichtsverfahren dazu beitragen, die Unterschiede zu 
verwischen. Diesbeziiglich kann man inbesondere auf die lex mercatoria, die Einschrlnkung 
gerichtlicher Kontrolle und die Entwicklung zu transnationalen Schiedsgerichtsverfahren hin- 
weisen. 
Introduction 
1. Some years ago, I acted as chairman of an international arbitration case 
whose proceedings took one year in all to complete. 
The terms of reference were endorsed by the arbitrators and the parties in 
question by means of written correspondence, and two hearings were held; one 
of these concerned preliminary questions, i.e. formalities, limitation periods 
and procedural deadlines. whereas the other related to the substance of the 
case, each hearing lasting two days. The lawyers on both sides were German 
nationals and dealt with the arbitration proceedings with a good deal of 
thoroughness and a touch of fantasy. Both the procedural and substantive law 
which applied in this case were of the Continental type. 
Recently, a German colleague related to me the story of an arbitration case 
which had in part been conducted, to all practical intents and purposes, in 
accordance with standard common law proceedings and lasted eighty days. 
These proceedings consisted of a succession of hearings whose duration var- 
ied between one and two weeks, and which successively dealt with procedural 
objections, establishing which party was, in principle, to be held liable, the 
size of the damages awarded, individual claims, and finally, the allocation 
of costs. The lawyers representing each party were common law lawyers, 
trained in the Anglo-Saxon legal system, which meant, inter alia, that the oral 
proceedings as well as the speeches in practice constituted the oral reflection 
of the contents of the documents and pleadings submitted for the purpose of 
the hearing. 
Crucially, half the amount of time taken up by the proceedings was devoted 
to the questioning and the cross-examination of the witnesses and of legal 
experts. 
Although the comparison made here is one between two relatively extreme 
cases of arbitral proceedings applied in accordance with Continental and 
Anglo-saxon practice, I am of the opinion that it constitutes a suitably impres- 
sionistic introduction to this paper on international arbitration. 
2. Although this report will not dwell any further on either the history of 
Anglo-Saxon law or on judicial organisation. I would nevertheless venture, 
by way of introduction to a brief comparative study of the Continental and 
Anglo-Saxon legal system1 relating to international arbitration, to set each of 
these systems in their appropriate context. 
(a) The principle of 'due process of law' is based on English law. It is 
featured, in Norman French, in the Statute 28 Edward I11 c.3 (1354) and 
makes reference to an independant judiciary, the principle of a fair hearing, 
access to the courts, the absence of any form of pressure, be it of a political, 
' Any comparison made with the common law of arbitration will in practice be confirmed 
to English law (i.e. the legal system of England and Wales). For a more analytical comparative 
study, cf. the contributions in the Collection dedicated to A. FE'ITWEISS, L'arbitrage, travaux 
efforts du professeur Albert Fettweiss, Brussel, 1990. 
social or judicial nature, and the availability of advice and assistance from an 
independently organised legal profession. 
(b) English law is primarily lawyer's law, i.e. law which has been fashioned 
by legal practitioners, lawyers and judges. 
(c) Procedural rules under the current Anglo-Saxon system remain subject to 
the adversarial principle. However, there have recently occurred certain world 
trends in favour of a more interventionist role by the judge.2 Nevertheless, 
this adversarial principle is based primarily on the fundamental role played by 
the legal counsels of the parties who must endeavour to win their case before 
the judge. One of the consequences of this is that neither time nor money is 
spared in conducting a case.3 
(d) In the context of what has been stated above, particular attention must be 
drawn to the crucial role played by rules of procedure. In the words of Rene 
David: 
Nevertheless, in the eyes of common lawyers, rules of procedure are 
all-important. The overriding concern in seeking to resolve a dispute 
is that the court proceedings be conducted in a fair manner and that 
certain rules, regarded as indispensible in the adminstration of justice, be 
observed. In the light of this requirement, the correct application of the 
law which governs the substance of the case is a secondary matter. This 
way of thinking cannot fail to influence the manner in which arbitration is 
approached. Whereas on the European continent an essential distinction 
is drawn beween the arbitrator whose ruling is based on the law and 
the arbitrator whose ruling is based on considerations of fairness, this 
distinction, which concerns the very basis of the law, is unknown in the 
common law countries. The lawyers' concern will be primarily for rules 
of procedure: they will seek to ensure above all that the arbitrators have 
conducted proceedings in a fair manner, and that no 'misconduct' can 
be attributed to them in the manner in which they have conducted these 
proceedings.4 
' ~ f .  on this subject: M. STORME & D. COESTER-WALTJEN, "L'activisme du juge 1 
Der Aktivismus des Richters", in: General Reports of the 1Xth International Congress on 
Procedural Law, Coimbra 1991, Pessoa Vaz ed., 1991, in the course of being published. 
For an example of this characteristic in arbitration proceedings, cf. W. KUHN, "Praktische 
Erfahrungen im englischen Schiedsverfahren", in Handelsschiedsgerichtbarkeit in England 
und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1987, KBln, p. 97 et seq., in particular pp. 100-103. 
4 ~ .  DAVID, L'arbitrage duns le commerce international, Paris, 1982, 149. 
3. Where arbitration is referred to as meaning a method of private judicial 
decisionmaking, one possible reaction could be to consider that this is purely 
a private matter between the parties concerned, who must be left to fend for 
themselves. Parties who have opted for arbitration have made a definitive 
choice, and should not be allowed to bother the public courts before, during 
or after the arbitration proceedings in question. 
It is in England, more than anywhere else, that this fundamental approach, 
which .is a perfectly logical one, has formed the basic idea underlying the 
law of arbitrat i~n.~ Since those days, however, the need for a highly sophis- 
ticated system of arbitration has given rise to a complex network of rules, in 
which the relationship between the arbitrator and the public courts occupies 
a particularly crucial place. 
Before considering the various differences in greater detail, I should, for the 
sake of completeness, start by posing the all familiar question: does arbitration 
form part of the law of contracts or of the law of procedure? 
Personally, I am of the opinion that, however many areas of overlap or of 
autonomy it is possible to discern in this particular field, arbitration has more 
in common with the law of procedure than with the law of  contract^,^ since 
it is the intention of the parties to subject their dispute to a special type of 
judicial body. Although initially a different approach prevailed in England, 
this is probably the viewpoint which is adhered to in that country at present 
on pragmatic grounds,7 since issues which relate to fundamental metaphys- 
ical questions, are normally dismissed by the British as being 'Continental 
questions' .8 
Points of comparison and differences between the continental and the 
common lawarbitration 
4. On the Continent, arbitration has, since time immemorial, been regulated 
by the legislator. Also, most of the innovations in the law of arbitration were 
introduced in the 1980s, at a time when England had already set the trend 
with its recent Arbitration Act 1979. 
It is interesting to note in this context that in a number of common law 
countries, common law arbitration proceedings can still be conducted in 
' ~ f .  M.J. MUSTILL & S.C. BOYD, The law and practice of commercial arbitration in 
England, London, 1982. 
6 ~ .  STORME, "Contractuele mogelijkheden om geschillen altematief op te lossen", in 
Storme, Merchiers and Herbots, De overeenkomst vandaag en morgen, Antwerpen, 1990, p. 
565 et seq., in particular p. 585. 
'A. KASSIS, Problhmes de base de l'arbitrage, Paris, 1987, p. 261 et seq. 
~ f .  J. GUITTON, Un sihcle, une vie, Paris, 1989, in a conversation between Lord Halifax 
and Sir Winston Churchill. 
accordance with the common law, which exists side by side with the rules 
laid down by statute (currently in England the Arbitration Acts of 1950, 1975 
and 1979). 
Since common law arbitration is only infrequently applied I merely mention 
it for the benefit of the curious without elaborating any further on ita9 
Apart from this marginal area, it is necessary to know that the English law 
of arbitration continues to be governed by three sources of law: legislation 
(the Arbitration Acts), the parties' agreement and the common law.'' 
5. Naturally, we must not lose sight of the fact that on the Continent, many 
arbitration proceedings enjoy the assistance of arbitration centres (Cepina in 
Brussels, NIA in the Netherlands, and, at the international level, CCI-ICC in 
Paris), which have their own rules of arbitration which are accepted by the 
parties. Where no reference is made to any institutional arbitration, we are 
dealing with an 'ad hoc' arbitration panel. 
England also has its many arbitration centres - e.g. the London Court of 
International Arbitration, LCIA - but the number of non-institutional arbitra- 
tion proceedings is probably much higher in this country than elsewhere. 
6. The methods by which arbitrators are appointed reveal no appreciable 
differences. However, the practice of appointing single arbitrators is higher 
in England than on the Continent. 
Contrary to the principle, applied elsewhere, that an uneven number of 
arbitrators should be appointed (cf. for example Article 1681 (1) Belgian 
Judicial Code), the most interesting feature of the English system is the 
practice of appointing two arbitrators, who must only appoint a third arbitrator, 
i.e. the umpire, in the absence of agreement between them. 
The same principle operates in relation to certain courts which, when 
hearing appeal cases, sit with two judges, and a third judge is added only 
where a disagreement arises between the original two. l 1  
This is, in my view, an excellent principle, which is particularly suitable 
from the point of view of procedural economy, in relation to both arbitration 
panels and the public courts. 
7. It is normally held that on the Continent, a distinction is maintained between 
the arbitration rulings made in accordance with the law, and arbitration rulings 
' ~ f .  on this subject: R. DAVID, L'arbitrage duns le commerce international, Paris, 1982, 
p. 150 et seq. 
'OC~. M.J. MUSTILL & S.C. BOYD, The law and practice of commercial arbitration in 
England, London, 1982, p. 6 7 .  
 or example in the Court of Appeal: J. JACOB, The Fabric of English Civil Justice, 
London, 1987, p. 220. 
made on the basis of considerations of equity (amiable compositeur), whereas 
the notion of the amiable composition does not exist in the common law. 
Naturally, it is necessary to put in its proper perspective the use made of 
this institution on the Continent. Thus it will be found that it is not used in 
Belgium, unless a clause whereby it is agreed to "rule in accordance with 
equity" has been accepted by the parties after the dispute has arisen, and that 
this is done at the initial stage of the proceedings (Article 1700(j), Article 
1683 Belgian Judicial code). l2 
Moreover, on the other side of the Channel it is possible to make arbitral 
rulings without giving reasons, subject to agreement to the contrary and to 
the provisions of Section l(5) of the 1979 Arbitration Act : 
Subject to subsection (6) below, if an award is made and, on an application 
made by any of the parties to the reference, 
(a) with the consent of all the other parties to the reference, or 
(b) subject to section 3 below, with the leave of the court, it appears to 
the High Court that the award does not or does not sufficiently set out 
the reasons for the award, the court may order the arbitrator or umpire 
concerned to state the reasons for his award in sufficient detail to enable 
the court, should an appeal be brought under this section, to consider any 
question of law arising out of the award. 
Finally, Section 43 of the Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) stipulates that the arbitrator may give a ruling "which 
the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement 
of the parties".'3 and there are increasing calls in England in favour of an 
amiable composition if accepted by the parties.14 
8. As regards the conduct of the proceedings, it is possible to discern two 
approaches: 
(a) either the parties determine the manner in which proceedings shall be 
conducted, and 
l2 CCIIICC figures show that, in the arbitration practice developed under its auspices, 1 to 4 
per cent of cases are settled by way of amiable composition. 
I3cf. T.E. CARBONNEAU, Le droit amkricain de l'arbitrage, in A. Fettweis, L'arbitrage, 
o.c., p. 205 et seq. 
145. STEYN, "Towards a new English Arbitration Act", Arb. Int., 1991, p. 17 et seq., in 
particular p. 23-24. 
(b) in the absence of any agreement to this effect, the conduct of the pro- 
ceedings shall be imposed by statute or regulation, unless the parties 
have explicitly agreed that this shall not be so. 
Here too, arbitration practice shows that whereas the first solution is that 
adopted in England and the second is that which applies on the Continent, 
this distinction is no longer as evident as it used to be; moreover, in England 
there are increasing calls for arbitration procedures to be imposed by statute 
rather than left to the parties.15 
An interesting procedure which applies in England is that of the 'stay of 
proceedings'.16 In most European countries, arbitration proceedings cannot 
be brought to a standstill by the public courts, as is illustrated by the provisions 
of Article 1679(1) of the Belgian Judicial Code, which states: 
Where a court is seized of a dispute which is subject to arbitration, it shall 
disclaim jurisdiction to settle the case at the suit of one of the parties, 
unless this dispute is not governed by a valid agreement, or where such 
agreement has expired. Any plea to this effect must be raised before any 
other plea or defence. 
On the other hand, the English court has discretion to decide whether or 
not a 'case of arbitration' of which they were seized may be continued before 
that court or must be terminated, as can be seen from the terms of Section 
4(1) of the Arbitration Act 1950, which states 
If any party to an arbitration agreement, or any person claiming through 
or under him, commences any proceedings in any court against any other 
party to the agreement, or any person claiming through or under him, 
in respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to those legal 
proceedings may at any time after appearance, and before delivering any 
pleadings or taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to that court 
to stay the proceedings, and that court or a judge thereof, if satisfied that 
there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in 
accordance with the agreement, and that the applicant was, at the time 
when the proceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and 
willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, 
may make17 an order staying the proceedings. 
9. Of fundamental importance is naturally the procedural relationship 
between the court and the parties as it expresses itself in the English adver- 
l5 J .  STEYN, op. cit. Arb. Int., 1991, p. 17 et seq., in particular p. 20. 
1 6 ~ s  regards the special rules which apply in international arbitration, cf. MUSTILL & 
BOYD, op. cit. p. 9. 
" ~ r n ~ h a s i s  added by the author. 
sarial principle, under which, although on opposite sides, the parties lead the 
proceedings18 and the judge passively looks on. It is this relationship which 
will also be found in the relevant arbitration clause, since in England it is 
the parties which normally determine the speed of the proceedings and the 
method according to which they are conducted, whereas on the Continent, 
these aspects of the arbitration clause are largely a matter for the arbitrator to 
decide. 
10. The largely oral nature of English arbitration procedures obviously has 
its origins in the jury system. Since the jury was only selected shortly before 
the opening of the hearing, both the facts and the applicable law needed to 
be extensively clarified orally, since this could not be done beforehand. As 
a result of this, everything, i.e. the facts, arguments, evidence and relevant 
documents, is explained orally on the basis that the judge knows nothing 
about the case before him. 
All this entails that the English hearings are of considerable importance 
and of long duration,lg whereas on the Continent, arbitral proceedings are in 
most cases prepared in extensive written form, and the hearing confines itself 
to a brief summary, provided by the parties, and questioning by the arbitrator, 
who will have prepared the case file very thoroughly in advance. 
11. The above naturally also determines the nature of the evidence before the 
panel, particularly in relation to both the search for the truth as a principle 
and the manner in which this is achieved. 
In my view, the best definition of the method by which the truth is ascer- 
tained on the Continent was given by Leo Rosenberg where he wrote: 
So liegt das Wesen des modernen Zivilprozesses in einer Arbeitsge- 
meinschaft von Richtern und Parteien, die zusammen dafiir zu sorgen 
haben, da13 dem Richter die sichere Findung der Wahrheit ermoglicht 
und in einem lebendigen Verlahren der Rechtsfriede unter den streiten- 
den Parteien wiederhergestellt und damit der Frieden der Allgemeinheit 
gesichert werde.*O 
In the common law countries, on the other hand, it is assumed that the 
search for the truth is best left to experienced lawyers who, on both sides, are 
l 8  Here, I have omitted the more sophisticated developments in this field, cf. on this subject 
M. STORME & D. COESTER-WALTJEN, in: General Reports of the IXth International 
Congress on Procedural Law, Coimbra 1991. 
 o ow ever, they must be highly concentrated, i.e. restricted to one hearing - which will if 
necessary take up several weeks. 
'OL. ROSENBERG, Lehrbuch des Deutschen Zivilprozessrechts, 7. Aufl, Miinchen-Berlin, 
1956, p. 6. 
responsible for the collection and the production of evidence, and do so in an 
impartial manner: 'Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both 
sides of the question' .21 
This is confirmed by the manner in which evidence is produced both in 
England and on the Continent. In England, witnesses are designated and 
called up by the parties, whilst on the Continent, although the witnesses may 
naturally be designated by the parties, the judge may also do so by virtue of 
his office; also, it is the judge who calls up the witnesses. 
In England, the witnesses are questioned by means of cross-examination, 
'the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth'.22 On 
the Continent, however, the witnesses are questioned by the arbitrator, who 
may or may not do so on the basis of the questions put by the parties.23 
Special mention must be made of the fact that in common law countries, 
the witnesses who are scheduled to appear in court are coached and tested by 
the lawyers before the hearing, which would obviously be unthinkable on the 
Continent. 
As regards documents and other items of evidence, the common law coun- 
tries apply the procedure known as the 'discovery of documents', under which 
it is possible to order the production of all documents which are in the pos- 
session of the other party and which relate to the dispute in question.24 This 
amounts as it were to a duty to designate and communicate all the relevant 
documents. 
No such obligation exists on the Continent - nevertheless, the arbitrator 
may well draw certain conclusions from any refusal to produce documents, 
and in some cases it will be possible to penalise such b e h a ~ i o u r . ~ ~  
In the common law, frequent use is made of expert witnesses, i.e. experts 
who provide the court with technical explanations. Such experts can also 
2' Lord ELDON, quoted by H. KOTZ, "The role of the Judge in the Courtroom, the Common 
Law and the Civil Law Compared, T.S.A.R., Tijdskrifvoor Suid-Afrikaans Reg, 1987, p. 35 et 
seq., in particular p. 37. 
2 2 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  Evidence, 1940, London, para. 1367, 29. For a detailed analysis of the 
hearing and cross-examination procedures, cf. W.H. GILL, "United Kingdom", Yearbook of 
Commercial Arbitration, 11, 1977, p. 90 et seq, in particular p. 103. 
23However, in the event of any incidental pleas in the course of these proceedings, the 
abitrator will, in Belgium, be compelled to refer the case to the ordinary courts; cf. Article 
1696 Judicial Code. 
2 4 ~ f .  M. STORME, De bewijslast in het Belgisch privaatrecht, Gent, No. 254, 1962, p. 
229-230. 
25 In Belgium, this can, for example, amount to compensation (Article 882 Judicial Code) 
andlor a daily fine called astreinte (Article 1385bis Judicial Code). See also the proposal on 
discovery made by the working group which under my chairmanship prepared a document 
for the European Commission on the approximation of Judiciary law: M. STORME (ed.), 
Rapprochement du droit judiciaire en Europe/Approximation of Judiciary Laws in Europe, 
The Hague, 1994. 
be 'legal experts', i.e. lawyers giving advice in relation to certain problems 
which arise from the applicable law. Where, for example, it proves necessary 
to apply Egyptian law in the context of an international arbitration, it might 
be deemed necessary sometimes to use the services of Egyptian lawyers in 
order to explain the scope of a certain legal rule. 
In such cases, the expert witnesses will be designated, called up and ques- 
tioned by the parties. 
This type of witness will be used less often in Continental arbitration 
proceedings. If it is decided to involve one such witness, the arbitrator will 
need to take the appropriate steps to bring this about, and will in most cases 
request a written report. 
12. Earlier, we raised the question of the extent to which a decision must be 
reasoned (cf. supra). At present, it can fairly be stated that there is a strong 
trend in favour of reasoned decisions, which could, in addition, form the basis 
for a supranational system of law, i.e. the so-called lex rner~atoria .~~ 
There is a clear connection between the reasoning of a decision and the 
supervision exercised by the public authorities. As the latter decreases, so the 
arbitration panels will be increasingly prepared to disclose the reasons for 
their decisions. 
However, it must be stressed that the reasoning of a decision is an impor- 
tant element in support of arbitration as an institution. Both the parties and 
- where the arbitration proceedings are published, which is, in my view, 
highly desirable27 - third parties must be convinced by the arguments of the 
arbitrators, who will thus be able to justify their decisions. 
13. It is also possible for the English courts to rectify the arbitrators' errors 
or, to use a more appropriate phrase, to refer a case back to the arbitrator in 
order that he may adopt an improved decision.28 This would be unthinkable 
on the Continent, except for institutional arbitrations which are subject to 
a final formal supervision by the institution which monitors the arbitration 
proceedings. This is, for example, the case with the CCHCC in Paris, for 
which Article 21 of the applicable rules states: 
Before signing an award, whether partial or definitive, the arbitrator shall 
submit it in draft form to the Court. The Court may lay down modifications 
2 6 ~ o r  an extensive commentary on this issue, cf. F. DE LY, De lex mercatoria, Antwerpen, 
1990. 
"Cf. on this subject: J. LEW, "The Case for the Publication of the Arbitration Awards", in: 
The Art of Arbitration, Deventer, 1982, p. 223 et seq. 
28 ~ u t u a l  Shipping Corporation v. Bayshore Shipping Corporation, 1985, 1 W.L.R.L. 615 
C. A. 
as to the form of the award and, without affecting the arbitrator's liberty 
of decision, may also draw his attention to points of substance. No award 
shall be signed until it has been approved by the Court as to its form.29 
14. It is a fact that there exists a good deal of agreement on the question of 
accepting the proposition that arbitration decisions should not be subjected 
to any further supervision as to their substance (on the merits) on the part of 
the courts. 
On the Continent, the most liberal approach has been adopted by Belgium, 
since Article 1717(4) of the Judicial Code states that the Belgian courts 
may only adjudicate on an application for annulment where at least one of 
the parties to the dispute on which an arbitration decision was made is a 
natural person of Belgian nationality, a natural person having his residence in 
Belgium or a legal person established in Belgium or having a subsidiary or a 
registered office in ~ e l ~ i u m . ~ '  
In England, the 1979 Arbitration Act provides a limited right of appeal 
which concerns legal issues arising from the arbitration decision and which 
fundamentally affect the rights of the parties. This right of appeal may only 
be used with the agreement of the court, unless the parties have agreed among 
themselves that there should be a right of appeal.31 
Particularly interesting is the fact that in international arbitration proceed- 
ings, the parties may conclude an 'exclusion agreement', i.e. agree that they 
should waive the right of appeal. 
Summarizing conclusions 
15. An attempt could be made to derive a comprehensive summary from the 
above; however, this would be quite a difficult assignment, since the differ- 
ences involved do not present a coherent and consistent whole. Moreover, 
there is currently in progress a remarkable development tending towards a 
network of arbitration systems the world over which evolve along similar 
lines, in the context of international arbitration. This process of continental- 
ising' arbitration proceedings has, moreover, also been the outcome of the 
 his monitoring process has, moreover, been accepted by the Belgian Cour de Cassation, 
cf, its decision of 8/12/1988. 
3 0 ~ o r  a commentary of this provision, cfr. M. STORME & B. DEMEULENAERE, Interna- 
tional Arbitration in Belgium, Deventer, 1989. 
31 Cf. on this subject: MUSTILL & BOYD, The law and practice of commercial arbitration 
in England, p. 555 et seq. 
1958 New York Convention relating to the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.32 
(a) In Anglo-Saxon law, and particularly in England, there existed a good deal 
of mistrust towards arbitration, which in most cases was, and to acertain extent 
still is, reflected in the possibility of judicial review of arbitration decisions by 
the public courts. 
This undoubtedly has its origins in the unique position occupied by the 
courts in the English legal system. 
This unique place is in my view best illustrated by the manner in which 
the English judge expresses himself on the subject of the case before him, 
in which he has remained totally neutral prior to the decision. A perfect 
example is the Errol Flynn case, in which the opening statement by Lord 
Justice Megany says: 
Errol Flynn was a film actor whose performance gave pleasure to many 
millions. On June 20, 1909, he was born in Hobart, Tasmania; and on 
Octoter 14, 1959, he died in Vancouver, British Columbia. When he was 
17 he was expelled from school in Sydney; and in the next thirty-three 
years he lived a life which was full, lusty, restless and colourful. In his 
career, in his three marriages, in his friendships, in his quarrels, and in bed 
with the many women he took there, he lived with zest and irregularity. 
The lives of film stars are not cast in the ordinary mould; and in some 
respects Errol Fllynn's was more stellar than most. When he died, he 
posed the only question that I have to decide: Where was he domiciled at 
the time of his death?33 
(b) Paradoxically enough, however, it must be noted that in England, much 
more than on the Continent, there existed, and continues to exist, a large degree 
of co-operation between the public courts on the one hand, and the parties 
to arbitration proceedings on the other hand. This co-operation can assume a 
wide variety of forms, ranging from the sustaining to the discontinuation of 
arbitration proceedings, through the monitoring, rectification or annulment of 
intervening arbitration decisions. 
To use a figure of speech, in England the public courts and the arbitrators 
are two captains on the same ship, whereas on the Continent, each governs 
32 Over 80 countries have acceded to this Convention. Further commentary on this subject can 
be found in: M. STORME & B. DEMEULENAERE, International Commercial Arbitration 
in Belgium, p. 113 et seq. 
3 3 ~ e  Flynn, 1969 1 All ER 49, 50, quoted by H. KOTZ, ZS.A.R., 1987, p. 35 et seq., in 
particular p. 42. 
his own ship; however, there are occasions on which the one must be piloted 
by the other. 
In addition, it is necessary to highlight specifically the fact that in the course 
of history, and especially during the past few decades, there has developed a 
special relationship between the arbitrator and the public courts, which could 
perhaps best be described as a LAT-relationship (living apart together). 
They are not in competition with each other - which would be impossible 
anyway since the contest would be an extremely unequal one - because in 
most cases they act in separate fields. 
They have a good deal to learn from each other. Arbitrators must be as 
independent and impartial as the public courts, whereas the public courts 
could learn something by considering the type of 'managerial justice' which 
is applied in arbitration rulings. 
They must co-operate. Where the parties in question, or third parties, prove 
to be recalcitrant, arbitrators need the public courts so that the latter may 
assist them, compel the parties to comply and render the arbitration ruling 
enforceable. In other words, although they act in separate domains, ultimately 
they cannot do without each other. 
(c) Naturally, it remains a remarkable fact - and indeed, we are dealing 
here with proceedings as they are conducted in fact rather than with major 
differences of principle - that proceedings before the arbitrator are as typical 
as those before the ordinary courts; in England, this means that proceedings 
are on the slow side, oral and led by the parties. 
Recently, an English practitioner - wrongly, in my view - rued the fact 
that in construction cases, the usual English procedure was being followed 
less and less frequently, and that in particular the hearings and the statements 
by the witnesses were being made subject to severe  limitation^.^^ However, 
the worst possible outcome in the opposite direction would be the cumulative 
application of the Continental and Anglo-Saxon procedures, since in this case 
we would be faced with protracted written and oral proceedings.35 
(d) Here and there, it is possible to discern a clear trend towards a greater 
measure of autonomy in the case of arbitration proceedings, more particularly 
international arbitration. This liberalisation, i.e. a gradual process of emanci- 
pation from judicial control, has taken place and - again remarkably - found 
34 ~ f .  I.N. DUNCAN WALLACE, "Deficiencies in Current International Arbitration Practice 
in Construction Cases", Arb. int., 1991, p. 149 et seq. 
35Cf. the example given in the Introduction. 
its origins in England (1979), followed by France (1983), Belgium (1985), 
the Netherlands (1988) and Switzerland (1989) .36 
(e) Because international arbitration is becoming a unique instrument in the 
process of harmonising commercial law, there should be developed a kind of 
'quality control',37 which in my view should concern the following issues: 
the justification of arbitration decisions by extensive reasoning, a highly 
concentrated procedure in which the excesses of both the (continental) written 
procedure and of the (Anglo-Saxon) oral procedure would be avoided, co- 
operation between the public courts and the arbitrator, whose sole objective 
would be to give maximum effect to the arbitration decision. 
It is clear that on this point, the common law and the continental law 
complement each other particularly well; all that is needed is to weed out the 
festering excesses and nurture new implantations. 
16. There has occurred a phenomenal growth in international commercial 
arbitration, and this has revealed a number of trends which are important 
in relation to the differences between the common law and the civil law 
countries. 
(a) There is a clear process of deregulation on the procedural side of arbitration 
proceedings which has been caused through both arbitration practice and 
legislation. It would be useless to try to discern any question of principle 
behind this phenomenon. 
It is mainly a factor of a kind of arbitration consumerism which allows 
the users of these proceedings "to vote with their arbitration clauses".38 Each 
country is attempting to attract arbitration to its territory by liberalising its 
arbitration legislation. 
(b) Should the same law of arbitration apply everywhere, with the UNCI- 
TRAL Arbitration ~ u l e s ~ '  serving as a model?40 Personally, I would not as 
yet be ardent advocate of such a process. It might be more appropriate, in the 
3 6 ~ h i s  explains why the choice of the country of arbitration is important: see M. STORME 
& F. DE LY, The place of arbitration, Gent, 1992. 
37 I-Iere, I will leave aside the question of who should be called upon to monitor this quality 
as laid down in a code of conduct in arbitration proceedings: should this be left to a centre for 
international arbitration, an international court or a national public court or arbitration panel? 
3 8 ~ u ~ t e d  in J. STEYN, op, cit. Arb. Int., 1991, p. 25. 
3 9 ~ h i s  abbreviation stands for United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. 
40 ~ f .  H. STROHBACH, "Towards an International Arbitral Award", in The art ofarbitration, 
p. 5. 
context of the harmonisation of European procedural law,41 to approximate 
international arbitration proceedings within the European 
(c) In addition, the different legal systems which apply in Europe tend to be 
one of the enriching features of a multi-cultural Europe. Here, comparative 
law could be an engine in the process of improving and enhancing national 
law. 
(d) In my view, the major breakthrough will occur elsewhere, i.e. in the 
development of a non-national and transnational law of arbitration which, 
provided that it observes certain fundamental principles of proper arbitration, 
would no longer be narrowly tied to national territories. 
(e) Without wishing to engage in the debate surrounding the Lex Mercatoria, 
it can fairly be stated that, whatever form it may take, if it presents a fair 
arbitral trial (procedural law) on the one hand, and acknowledges general- 
ly accepted legal rules of proper conduct in international trade (substantive 
rules) on the other hand, the law of international arbitration can give an added 
ethical dimension to the bona fide activities of individuals and firms through- 
out the world. 
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41 The working group (Approximation of judiciary Law in Europe) of which I was privileged 
to be the chairman has not decided to place the issue of arbitration on its agenda. Nevertheless 
this would appear desirable since arbitration does not come within the EEC Treaty; for an 
extreme case of this non-applicability, cf. ECJ decision of 25/7/1991, Marc Rich v. Societa 
Italiani Impianti. 
42 See also my report in Approximation of Judiciary Laws in Europe/Rapprochement du droit 
judiciaire en Europe, op. cit., p. 34. 
